The evolving role of marriage: 1950–2010 by Lundberg, Shelly J & Pollak, Robert A.
The Evolving Role of Marriage: 1950–2010
VOL. 25 / NO. 2 / FALL 2015  29
The Evolving Role of Marriage: 1950 –2010
Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak
Summary
Since 1950, marriage behavior in the United States has changed dramatically. Though 
most men and women still marry at some point in their lives, they now do so later and are 
more likely to divorce. Cohabitation has become commonplace as either a precursor or an 
alternative to marriage, and a growing fraction of births take place outside marriage.
We’ve seen a retreat from marriage within all racial and ethnic groups and across the 
socioeconomic spectrum. But the decoupling of marriage and parenthood has been much 
less prevalent among college graduates. Why are college graduates such a prominent 
exception?
Some scholars argue that marriage has declined furthest in low-income communities because 
men with less education have seen their economic prospects steadily diminish, and because 
welfare and other social programs have let women rear children on their own. Others 
contend that poor women have adopted middle-class aspirations for marriage, leading them 
to establish unrealistic economic prerequisites. The problem with these explanations, write 
Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak, is that they focus on barriers to marriage only in very 
poor communities. Yet we’ve seen a retreat from marriage among a much broader swath of 
the population.
Lundberg and Pollak argue that the sources of gains from marriage have changed in such a 
way that families with high incomes and high levels of education have the greatest incentives 
to maintain long-term relationships. As women’s educational attainment has overtaken that 
of men, and as the ratio of men’s to women’s wages has fallen, they write, traditional patterns 
of gender specialization in household and market work have weakened. The primary source 
of gains from marriage has shifted from production of household services to investment in 
children. For couples whose resources allow them to invest intensively in their children, 
marriage provides a commitment mechanism that supports such investment. For couples 
who lack the resources to invest intensively in their children, on the other hand, marriage 
may not be worth the cost of limited independence and potential mismatch.
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boom in the 1950s—just over 20 for women, 
and about 23 for men. A modest delay 
in first marriages during the 1960s was 
followed by a rapid increase in marriage age 
that continued for the next four decades.3 
Additional years in school explain part of 
this delay: among both young men and 
women, college attendance rose steadily 
until the 1980s, when improvements in 
men’s educational attainment stalled while 
women’s continued to rise. The proportion 
of young adult women with college degrees 
equaled, and then exceeded, that of men 
in the 1990s.4 Beginning in the 1980s, 
increases in premarital cohabitation by 
young couples became another important 
force behind marriage timing; the age 
at which households were first formed 
remained roughly constant while first 
marriages were further delayed.5 
Marriage delay reduced the fraction of 
young men and women who were currently 
married (or ever married) while in their 
twenties. But in the 1970s, the prevalence 
of marriage began to decline even for 
older men and women. Figure 1 shows this 
decline for men and women ages 30 to 44, 
much of it accounted for by an increase in 
cohabitation. Data from the National Survey 
of Family Growth, which has conducted 
in-home interviews with national samples 
of 15- to 44-year-old women since 1973, 
show an eight percentage point drop in 
the fraction of women who were currently 
married between 1982 and the most recent 
wave of data collection, in 2006–10. That 
decline, from 44 to 36 percent, was exactly 
offset by the increase in the proportion 
who were cohabiting, which rose from 3 
to 11 percent, leaving the prevalence of all 
coresidential unions (that is, marriage and 
cohabitation combined) unchanged.6
The gap between the proportion of 30- to 
44-year-olds currently married (now about 
A“quiet revolution” in American women’s careers, education, and family arrangements began in the 1970s.2 During the prosperous years of the 
post-war baby boom, couples married after 
leaving school, and most young mothers 
stayed at home with their children. Many 
mothers returned to the labor force when 
their children were grown, but their 
educational and career aspirations were 
shaped by domestic responsibilities. As 
fertility rates fell and women’s intermittent 
employment turned into lifetime 
commitments to market work and careers, 
the terms of the marital agreement changed. 
People increasingly delayed marriage to 
attend college or because they expected 
smaller families, and divorce rates rose. 
Marriage as a social institution appeared to 
be endangered.
By the turn of the century, the state and 
future of marriage in the United States 
had become the focus of considerable 
scholarly and public attention. More men 
and women than ever, though still a small 
minority, do not marry at all. Cohabitation, 
both as a precursor and an alternative to 
marriage, has become commonplace. A 
growing fraction of births take place outside 
marriage. Though this overall retreat from 
marriage can be observed among all major 
racial and ethnic groups and across the 
socioeconomic spectrum, there has been a 
pronounced divergence between marriage 
and childbearing trends at the top and 
the bottom of the income distribution. 
In particular, the apparent decoupling of 
marriage and parenthood that has caused so 
much concern among policy makers and the 
public has been much less prevalent among 
college graduates. 
The median age at first marriage hit a 
historic low during the height of the baby 
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60 percent) and the proportion who have 
ever been married (80 percent for women, 
74 percent for men) has widened due to 
increases in divorce (figure 1). The annual 
divorce rate (the number of divorces per 
thousand married couples) more than 
doubled between 1960 and 1980, from less 
than 10 to more than 20. The divorce rate 
stabilized after 1980, though it continued to 
rise among certain age groups.7
In recent decades, the social and legal 
significance of marriage has eroded. The 
costs of exiting marriage fell as unilateral 
divorce regimes, in one form or another, 
were adopted across the United States. 
Children born out of wedlock acquired 
greater rights to financial support and 
inheritance through a series of Supreme 
Court decisions in the 1960s and 1970s.8 
Marriage also became less important 
for determining fathers’ child support 
obligations when, during the 1990s, the 
states (following a federal mandate) 
introduced in-hospital, voluntary programs 
that reduced the costs of establishing legal 
paternity.9 Changes in social norms have 
also played a role: the stigmas associated 
with nonmarital sex, cohabitation, 
nonmarital fertility, and divorce have 
declined dramatically.10 As the boundaries 
blurred, spells of cohabitation became 
longer and more likely to involve children.11
Rising rates of nonmarital fertility in the 
United States have received a great deal 
of attention from researchers and policy 
makers. The median age at first marriage 
for women has been rising more rapidly 
than the median age at first birth. In 1991, 
the two trends crossed, and they continue 
to diverge. In 2010, the median age at 
first birth (25.3) was nearly one year lower 
than the median age of women at first 
marriage (26.1).12 The circumstances in 
which nonmarital births take place have 
been changing. For women who reached 
childbearing age in the 1950s through 
the mid-1960s, the primary cause of 
rising premarital births was an increase in 
premarital pregnancies that were brought 
to term (and, in all probability, an increase 
in premarital sex). During the following two 
decades, the principal factor driving the 
upward trend in premarital childbearing 
was that people became less likely to marry 
following a premarital conception—that 
is, the prevalence of so-called “shotgun 
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weddings” has declined.13 At the same 
time, the proportion of nonmarital births 
to lone mothers has also been decreasing: 
52 percent of nonmarital births now occur 
within cohabiting unions, many of them 
“shotgun cohabitations.”14 
Compared with other wealthy countries, 
the United States is an outlier in many 
dimensions of family dynamics. The level 
of fertility that occurs outside any union—
marital or cohabiting—is relatively high 
here, and both marital and cohabiting 
unions are very unstable.15 In many 
northern European countries, cohabitation 
has progressed further in the direction of 
becoming a replacement for marriage: a 
much smaller proportion of the population 
ever marries, rates of cohabitation and 
proportions of births within cohabiting 
unions are much higher, and these unions 
are much more durable.16 Like the 
United States, most countries in Europe 
show a socioeconomic gradient in family 
structure—people with less education are 
more likely both to cohabit and to have 
children outside of marriage—but these 
discrepancies are less pronounced there.17
The different trends in marriage behavior 
across socioeconomic groups are most easily 
seen by focusing on a single racial group. 
Among whites, the retreat from marriage 
has been much more rapid for men and 
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women with less education (figure 2). 
We place people into three groups: college 
graduates, those with some college, and 
those with a high school education or 
less. The proportion of men ages 30 to 
44 who are currently married (reflecting 
both marriage and divorce behavior) has 
decreased for men with a college degree, 
but it has declined substantially more for 
men with less education. Until 1990, women 
without college degrees were more likely 
to be married than were female college 
graduates, but since then the opposite 
has been true. Rates of both marriage and 
remarriage have risen for women with 
college degrees relative to women with less 
education.18 Long-term marital stability has 
a steep education gradient: the predicted 
probability that a first marriage will remain 
intact for 15 years is sharply higher for white 
women with a college degree (80 percent) 
than for white women with some college 
(57 percent) or those with a high school 
diploma (53 percent).19
The prevalence of cohabitation sharply 
decreases as education rises (table 1), 
and cohabitation tends to play different 
roles for women with high and low 
levels of education. For highly educated 
women, cohabitation usually precedes 
marriage—a part of courtship or a trial 
marriage that rarely includes childbearing. 
Serial cohabitation (that is, multiple 
premarital cohabiting relationships) is 
much more prevalent among economically 
disadvantaged men and women. And, among 
poorer and less-educated people, cohabiting 
unions are more likely to end in dissolution 
than in marriage.20
Compared with other 
wealthy countries, the 
United States is an outlier 
in many dimensions of 
family dynamics.
The growing divergence in marriage, 
cohabitation, and fertility behavior 
across educational groups may have 
important implications for inequality and 
the intergenerational transmission of 
economic advantage and disadvantage. In 
her presidential address to the Population 
Association of America in 2004, Princeton 
sociologist Sara McLanahan (the editor-in-
chief of Future of Children) showed how 
the rise in single-parent families, along 
with widening gaps in divorce rates and 
the age at which women have children, 
Table 1. Current Union Status by Percentage among Women Aged 15–44 Years, 2006–10
  Second    
 First marriage  Never in Formerly
 marriage or higher Cohabiting a union married
No high school diploma or GED 36.6 7.7 20.2 19.1 16.5
High school diploma or GED 39.5 9.2 15.5 20.3 15.6
Some college 42.1 7.4 11.6 26.4 12.6
Bachelor’s degree 58.3 3.3 6.8 25.5 6.1
Master’s degree or higher 63.0 4.4 5.5 20.1 7.0
Source: Casey E. Copen, Kimberly Daniels, Jonathan Vespa, and William D. Mosher, “First Marriages in the United States: 
Data from the 2006 –10 National Survey of Family Growth,” National Health Statistics Reports 49 (2012): 1–22.
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clearly reinforced the retreat from marriage, 
but the evolution of these norms has also 
been shaped by behavioral responses to 
market forces.26
Since the 1970s, many young 
men, particularly those with 
low levels of education, have 
found it increasingly hard to 
establish a stable career with 
earnings above the poverty 
line, and this seems to have 
been an important factor in 
delaying marriage.
Economists view marriage as a choice made 
by individuals who evaluate the expected 
gains from a specific marriage compared 
with other marriages or with living alone. 
The potential gains from marriage fall into 
two broad categories: joint production and 
joint consumption. Production gains arise in 
a household that produces domestic goods 
such as home-cooked meals and child care. 
The advantages of a two-adult household 
come either from economies of scale (cooking 
meals for two people is usually cheaper, on 
a per capita basis, than cooking separately) 
or from a division of labor that allows one 
partner to specialize in market work and 
the other in domestic labor. Consumption 
gains come from the joint consumption of 
household public goods—goods that can be 
consumed by one person without diminishing 
the enjoyment of these goods by another. 
Housing and children are the standard 
examples of public goods in a family context. 
University of Michigan economists Betsey 
Stevenson and Justin Wolfers expanded 
were leading to growing disparities in the 
parental resources, both time and money, 
that children of more- and less-educated 
mothers receive.21 Young men and women 
today whose mothers attended college are 
more than twice as likely to graduate from 
college as are children with less-educated 
mothers.22 Johns Hopkins sociologist 
Andrew Cherlin has emphasized the costs 
to children, and particularly the children 
of people without a college education, of 
the instability in living arrangements and 
parental ties inherent in what he calls the 
American “marriage-go-round.”23 
Understanding the Retreat 
from Marriage
Social scientists examining the general 
decline in the prevalence and stability of 
legal marriage have focused on two forces: 
decreasing economic opportunities for many 
men and increasing economic opportunities 
for women. Steady employment and high 
earnings are strongly correlated with men’s 
marital status, probably because a stable 
income lets them fulfill a traditional role 
as family breadwinner. Since the 1970s, 
many young men, particularly those with 
low levels of education, have found it 
increasingly hard to establish a stable career 
with earnings above the poverty line, and 
this seems to have been an important factor 
in delaying marriage.24 Proponents of an 
alternative “independence hypothesis” have 
argued that, as women get more education 
and work and earn more, their increased 
economic independence should reduce their 
need for marriage. But most studies have 
found that women who earn more are more 
likely to marry, so empirical support for the 
independence hypothesis is limited.25 (See 
the article in this issue by Daniel Schneider 
for further discussion of the independence 
hypothesis.) Changing social norms about 
divorce, cohabitation, and gender roles have 
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the joint consumption category to include 
shared leisure activities as well as household 
public goods. They coined the phrase 
“hedonic marriage” to describe modern 
marriages in which there is little gender-
based division of labor and consumption 
benefits are paramount.27 Children can 
enhance the gains to marriage in two ways: 
because children provide joint consumption 
benefits to their parents, they are themselves 
household public goods, and coresidence 
lets their parents efficiently coordinate child 
care and investment in children.28
Though the most recent increases in age 
at first marriage can largely be attributed 
to increases in premarital cohabitation, the 
pronounced delay in marriage between 1970 
and 1990 was associated with an extended 
period of living alone. In this earlier period, 
then, marriage became less attractive 
and living alone became more attractive. 
Advances in contraceptive technology, 
changes in state laws in the 1970s regarding 
access to oral contraceptives, and the 
legalization of abortion made reliable 
fertility control readily available to young 
single women.29 These changes in technology 
and law, together with the weakening 
of norms that stigmatized premarital 
sex, reduced the risk and increased the 
availability of sex outside marriage or 
cohabiting unions. As a result, delaying 
“union formation” no longer required 
choosing between abstinence and the risk 
of an unplanned pregnancy. These changes 
in technology and law accelerated women’s 
entry into the labor force and particularly 
into careers that required extended periods 
of postsecondary education.30
Greater availability of market substitutes for 
goods and services that used to be produced 
in the household, as well as improvements in 
household technology, also made living alone 
more attractive. Market substitutes let people 
outsource functions such as cooking and child 
care that had traditionally been regarded 
as central to the family. Improvements 
in household technology, such as electric 
washing machines and microwaves, reduced 
not only the time people needed to perform 
household tasks but also the level of skill they 
required to clothe and feed themselves.31 
These market substitutes and household 
technologies were, to a considerable extent, 
a market response to the growing number 
of single-person households as well as to 
increased market work by women. 
As the potential quality of life for one-
adult households improved and women 
entered the work force, the value of 
specialization and exchange in two-person 
households fell. Gender specialization in 
married couple households has decreased 
dramatically during the past 60 years.32 The 
labor force participation rate for women 
ages 25 to 54 increased from 37 percent to 
75 percent between 1950 and 2010, while 
the participation rate for prime-age men 
fell from 97 percent to 89 percent. Though 
married women still spend more time than 
married men doing housework, women’s 
housework time has fallen by 10 hours per 
week since 1965 and men’s has increased 
by about four hours per week.33 As women’s 
educational attainment, wages, and hours of 
market work have risen relative to men’s, the 
opportunities for gains from trade within a 
household, which depend to a large extent 
on the segregation of men and women in 
separate home and market sectors, have 
diminished—and so have the potential gains 
to marriage.
The increased social acceptance of 
cohabitation, with or without children, has 
substantially changed the state of marriage. 
Since 1987, the proportion of women 
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who are currently cohabiting has more 
than doubled, and the increase has been 
particularly rapid among women with a 
high school education or some college.34 
Indeed, much of the decline in marriage 
during the past two decades involved 
substitution of cohabitation for legal 
marriage. Cohabitation provides many of 
the economic benefits of marriage, since 
a cohabiting couple can benefit from both 
joint production (for example, specialization 
and the division of labor, and economies 
of scale) and joint consumption (for 
example, shared leisure and household 
public goods, including children). What 
distinguishes marriage from cohabitation in 
an economically meaningful way?
For one thing, marriage is more costly 
to exit than cohabitation, and the costs 
of divorce are legal, social and, for most 
people, psychological. The legal costs of 
divorce have fallen as states have replaced 
fault-based or mutual-consent grounds 
for divorce with laws permitting unilateral 
divorce, and the social costs have also fallen 
as divorce has become commonplace. 
However, many sociologists note that people 
have come to see divorce as a terrible 
personal failure to be avoided, if necessary 
by delaying or avoiding marriage.35 The 
institution of marriage retains considerable 
cultural significance in America, and the 
public commitment to a permanent and 
exclusive relationship that marriage entails 
distinguishes it from cohabitation, which 
often begins informally and without an 
explicit discussion of terms or intentions.36 
These costs of divorce mean that marriage 
serves as a commitment mechanism 
that fosters cooperation and encourages 
marriage-specific investments, and 
economic models of marriage emphasize the 
relatively high cost of exit.37 Commitment 
devices let people lock themselves into 
courses of action that are desirable in 
the long term, but from which they may 
be tempted to deviate in the short term. 
Willingness to enter into a marriage from 
which it is costly to exit also signals to a 
mate a desire for long-term commitment. 
A plausible theory of marriage, however, 
must explain why such a long-term marital 
commitment is valuable, and this requires 
that we specify the types of gains that long-
term commitment can foster.
In a traditional marriage, in which the 
wife works exclusively in the household 
and the husband works exclusively in the 
market, long-term commitments support 
the production benefits of specialization and 
exchange.38 This pattern of specialization 
leaves the wife vulnerable because she 
fails to accumulate market skills that 
would increase her wages if she were to 
enter the labor market. Marriage and, in 
particular, the costs of divorce protect her. 
Specialization and vulnerability plausibly 
described most marriages in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, but they are 
less and less plausible as a rationale for 
contemporary American marriage in the 
face of men’s and women’s converging 
economic lives. With the production gains 
attributable to marriage declining, why do 
couples continue to marry?
Hedonic/consumption theories of marriage 
focus on shared leisure and household 
public goods. Although two-person living 
arrangements may have advantages over 
living alone, they don’t provide a rationale 
for long-term commitment unless they 
require investments in physical capital 
or in the stock of skills that economists 
call human capital. Shared leisure may 
involve the purchase of physical capital 
(for example, ski equipment) or investment 
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in activity-specific human capital (for 
example, skiing lessons), but this seems too 
insubstantial to provide a plausible account 
of marriage in the absence of production 
gains from specialization. In this sense, 
children differ from other household public 
goods both because parents tend to be 
extremely attached to their own children, 
whether defined by birth or adoption, 
and because stability and consistency in 
parenting enhances children’s wellbeing. 
Among its many functions, marriage is a 
legal and social institution that can help 
parents make a long-term commitment to 
invest in their children.
One of the most striking 
aspects of the trends in 
marriage behavior is the 
relative stability of traditional 
patterns of marriage and 
childbearing among the 
highly educated.
One of the most striking aspects of the 
trends in marriage behavior is the relative 
stability of traditional patterns of marriage 
and childbearing among the highly 
educated, compared with the pronounced 
retreat from marriage and marital 
childbearing among men and women with a 
high-school diploma or less and, to a lesser 
extent, among those with some college. 
Social scientists have identified three 
factors that may contribute to or cause the 
unevenness of the retreat from marriage: a 
decline in the marriageability of men with 
low levels of education; incentives created 
by government policies (for example, 
welfare benefits and the Earned Income 
Tax Credit); and the increasing cultural 
significance of marriage to women in low-
income communities.
The marriageability explanation attributes 
the decline in marriage to a pronounced 
deterioration in the economic prospects 
of men with low levels of education. This 
hypothesis is related to the relative wage 
hypothesis that we have already discussed 
(that is, the decline in the ratio of men’s 
wages to women’s wages, which drastically 
reduced the gains from the traditional 
pattern of gender specialization). But unlike 
the change in relative wages, the decline 
in marriageability applies only to men at 
the bottom of the earnings distribution. 
Many men who live in inner cities earn 
so little that they are likely to be a net 
drain on household resources.39 Harvard 
sociologist William Julius Wilson argues 
that the decline in inner-city industrial 
jobs has caused a shortage of marriageable 
men; among blacks, this shortage has 
been exacerbated by rising incarceration 
rates.40 Falling wages and employability 
made these men less able to contribute to a 
joint household and, hence, reduced their 
attractiveness as cohabiting partners or 
husbands. Marriage to or cohabitation with 
less-employable men may carry additional 
costs, to the extent that these men are at 
risk for incarceration or prone to substance 
abuse or violence. Outside of extremely 
disadvantaged groups, however, income-
pooling by unmarried mothers and the 
unmarried fathers of their children would 
lift many families above the poverty line.41 
In two books published almost three 
decades apart, American Enterprise 
Institute political scientist Charles Murray 
has argued that government welfare benefits 
and welfare policy caused the retreat from 
marriage.42 In the first, he contended 
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that both the value of welfare benefits 
and the fact that receiving benefits was 
conditioned on not having a man in the 
house caused poor women to substitute 
welfare dependency for marriage to provide 
for their children. More recently, he argued 
that welfare benefits have sapped the moral 
fiber of the working poor and triggered a 
cascade of bad behaviors. Murray’s socio-
psychological version of the marriageability 
hypothesis, however, applies only to those 
eligible or almost eligible for welfare 
benefits, and so it does not account for the 
breadth of the retreat from marriage.
Studies of how government tax and transfer 
programs affect marriage, cohabitation, 
and lone parenthood generally focus on the 
incentives created by a particular means-
tested program (for example, the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, food stamps, or 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) 
and how individuals and couples respond 
to these incentives. Most empirical studies 
find that, individually, these programs have 
had little or no effect.43 A study of how 
all means-tested programs taken together 
affect family structure and incentives to 
marry and cohabit would need to take 
into account state-specific rules and the 
complex interactions among the various 
programs.44 One of the few studies to 
investigate the effect of the marriage 
penalties and bonuses in the tax system 
on marriage and cohabitation by couples 
not eligible or almost eligible for welfare 
found that cohabiting couples are more 
likely to marry when they have positive tax 
incentives for doing so, but that the size of 
the effect is small.45
Based on their ethnographic work, 
sociologists Kathryn Edin and Maria 
Kefalas offer a cultural explanation of 
the decline in marriage among women in 
low-income communities, arguing that these 
women have unrealistically high aspirations 
for marriage.46 In these communities, 
they write, marriage is no longer closely 
connected to parenting. Rather, it’s about 
“the white picket fence dream”: good stable 
jobs and maturity are prerequisites. They 
focus, however, on severely disadvantaged 
women; thus, like the marriageability 
explanation, their work can’t account for 
the breadth of the retreat from marriage. 
Cherlin asserts more broadly that as the 
“practical significance” of marriage has 
diminished, its “cultural significance” has 
grown.47 
Culture does a better job explaining 
persistent similarities or differences 
in behavior across groups than it does 
explaining change. The rapid changes in 
cohabitation, marriage, and nonmarital 
fertility since 1960 are more easily explained 
as responses to changing incentives, rather 
than as responses to cultural changes in the 
significance of marriage. One could argue 
that the continuity in family life among white 
college-graduate men and women reflects 
their commitment to traditional cultural 
norms and values, but this argument assumes 
that college-graduate men and women are 
more committed to traditional norms and 
values than those with less education. We 
think it is more likely that the persistence 
of marriage patterns among this better-off 
group results from offsetting changes in 
incentives—specifically, the decrease in 
returns to traditional patterns of gender 
specialization and the increase in the 
returns to investment in children’s skills and 
capabilities, perhaps reinforced by a cultural 
script that emphasizes intensive investments 
in children.
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Marriage and Investments 
in Children
We’ve seen that the dramatic changes in 
women’s economic status since 1950 have 
led to wholesale redefinitions of men’s and 
women’s roles in the household, rendering 
obsolete the commitments between wage-
earning men and their stay-at-home wives 
that were central to marriage in the first half 
of the 20th century.48 Changes in family law 
and social norms weakened the marriage 
commitment by making divorce easier to 
obtain and blurring the social distinction 
between cohabitation and marriage. Once 
cohabitation became a legally and socially 
acceptable way to achieve the benefits 
of coresidential intimacy and economic 
cooperation, the advantages of living in a 
two-adult household no longer provided a 
rationale for marriage.
In our view, long-term commitment is 
valuable in early 21st century America 
primarily because it promotes investment 
in children. Thus differences across 
socioeconomic groups in how people 
perceive the returns to the joint project 
of investing in children can explain the 
unevenness of the retreat from marriage 
over the past three decades. This explanation 
is speculative, but it is consistent with 
emerging evidence on patterns of parental 
investment, and we find competing 
explanations unpersuasive.
Investment in children is clearly not the 
only reason couples have ever made long-
term commitments, nor do we claim it 
is the only reason couples do so now. In 
particular, not all women of childbearing 
age who marry intend to have children, 
and women who marry after menopause 
generally don’t intend to have additional 
children. For many older couples, the marital 
commitment may be to provide care for each 
other in old age. The debate over same-sex 
marriage is best understood as a contest 
over social recognition and acceptability, 
where considerations involving children 
play a secondary role. Despite these caveats, 
however, the link between marriage and 
childrearing remains fundamental.
Long-term commitment is 
valuable in early 21st century 
America primarily because 
it promotes investment in 
children. Thus differences 
across socioeconomic groups 
in how people perceive the 
returns to the joint project 
of investing in children can 
explain the unevenness of the 
retreat from marriage over 
the past three decades.
Couples may be much less likely than they 
were in the past to need marital commitment 
to support a sharply gender-specialized 
division of labor, but, among college-
graduate couples, marriage has persisted as 
the standard context for childrearing. Among 
the well-educated and well-off, intensive 
investment in children is a characteristic 
parenting pattern, and their investments 
have been increasing both in absolute 
terms and relative to the investments 
made by those with less education and 
fewer resources. Couples with low levels 
of education are more likely to choose 
cohabitation or lone parenthood as a context 
for rearing children, and their parenting 
practices are systematically different.
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Rising returns to human capital have 
contributed to increasing inequality and 
have increased parental incentives for 
intensive investment in children. Parents 
with limited resources and lower levels 
of skill, however, may expect the returns 
from early investments in children to be 
low, particularly if they are uncertain about 
their ability to make later investments that 
foster upward mobility. Poverty and/or 
uncertain employment prospects may also 
hamper investments in children through 
the demands they impose on parents’ 
mental and emotional resources. Finally, 
high-income, high-education parents may 
have better access to information about the 
payoffs to early child enrichment activities, 
and their actions may be reinforced by 
evolving class-specific social norms. 
For the best-off women, the decoupling of 
marriage and childbearing has simply not 
occurred. Single or cohabiting motherhood 
remains uncommon among non-Hispanic 
white college graduates, although these are 
the women most likely to have the earnings 
and employment benefits that would let 
them support a child alone (see table 2). 
Patterns of marriage, childbearing, and 
childrearing across education and income 
groups are consistent with the existence of 
a close connection between the decision to 
marry and childrearing practices. Within 
each racial and ethnic group, the rate of 
nonmarital childbearing declines sharply as 
mothers’ educational attainment rises. Vital 
statistics data reveal additional evidence 
that highly educated women postpone 
childbearing and wait for marriage until 
the biological clock has almost run out—for 
college-graduate women in their early 40s, 
the rate of nonmarital childbearing rises to 
10 percent.
Direct evidence on parental investments 
in children also shows pronounced and 
increasing inequality, and one key reason 
that parenting practices are diverging is 
likely to be the dramatic divergence in the 
resources of high- and low-income families 
since 1980. Data indicate that parents with 
more education spend more time with 
children and that parents with more income 
spend more money on children. The time 
parents spend with children has increased 
in recent decades despite rising rates of 
maternal employment.49 And despite their 
higher rates of employment, mothers with 
a college education spend about 4.5 hours 
more per week with their children than do 
mothers with a high-school degree or less.50 
Our own analysis shows that, among parents 
whose youngest child is under five, the 
widening gap in child-care time by parents’ 
education is particularly pronounced for 
fathers.51
Inflation-adjusted expenditures on children 
have increased over time, and these 
increases have been especially pronounced 
for high-income households.52 To a large 
Table 2. Nonmarital Births as a Proportion of All Births by Mother’s Education, 2010
 Non-Hispanic White Black Hispanic
High School or Less 53.6 83.5 59.6
Some College 31.0 68.7 45.3
College Graduate or More 5.9 32.0 17.4
Sources: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, VitalStats  
(http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/vitalstats.htm).
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extent, spending inequality across income 
groups has been driven by the increase in 
income inequality. But expenditures on 
children as a percentage of income have 
also been rising overall, particularly in the 
1990s and especially for people in the top 
20 percent of the income distribution. A 
study of expenditures on child “enrichment 
items” by income finds that parents’ spending 
on education and child care, trips and 
recreation, and books and computers rises 
with total expenditures, and that many such 
expenditures rise more rapidly than income, 
particularly for parents of older children.53 
The differences in time and money that 
parents spend on childrearing are reflected 
in parenting practices and attitudes. In 
her ethnographic research, University of 
Pennsylvania sociologist Annette Lareau 
documented pronounced class differences 
in childrearing practices that reflect parents’ 
“cultural repertories” for childrearing.54 
The “concerted cultivation” of middle-class 
children, consistent with the advice their 
parents receive from experts, is designed to 
foster children’s cognitive and social skills. 
This intensive investment includes parental 
involvement in recreational and leisure 
activities as well as school and schoolwork, 
and it is one source of the large gaps in skills 
and behavior that we see when children 
enter school.55 Psychologists have found 
significant differences in both vocabulary 
and language processing at 18 months. By 
24 months, toddlers from better-off families 
are six months ahead of more disadvantaged 
children. Infants’ exposure to what 
psychologists call child-directed speech is 
associated with early language acquisition.56 
In Lareau’s framework, working-class and 
poor families see successful parenting as 
consistently providing food, shelter, and 
other basic support, but not as the concerted 
cultivation practiced by middle-class parents. 
Edin and Kefalas conclude that in the face of 
economic hardship, poor mothers “adopt an 
approach to childrearing that values survival, 
not achievement.”57
In the rational-choice framework that 
economists and many other social scientists 
use, parents who have full information about 
children’s developmental needs and the 
relationship between parents’ actions and 
children’s outcomes might choose different 
child investment strategies because they 
have different preferences or perceived 
opportunities. One possible source of class 
differences in parenting that falls outside 
this framework is gaps in knowledge about 
children’s developmental needs and the 
relationship between parents’ actions and 
children’s outcomes. If parents in general 
don’t realize that talking with or reading to 
their children can increase their children’s 
vocabularies, then the class gradient 
in children’s vocabularies could be an 
unintended by-product of following different 
class-specific cultural norms, and not the 
result of parents deliberately choosing 
different investment strategies. Alternatively, 
highly educated parents may have better 
information about the returns to time and 
activities with children. Time-use data 
provide some support for the information 
hypothesis: highly educated mothers not 
only spend more time on child care than 
less-educated mothers do, but they also 
adjust time and activities as their children 
age in ways that are more developmentally 
appropriate.58 In either of these scenarios, 
teaching parents about the effects of 
alternative parenting practices could affect 
their behavior and, hence, their children’s 
development. 
Preferences regarding outcomes for children 
or activities with children seem unlikely 
to differ systematically with income or 
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education. If all parents love and are 
attached to their children, then they 
will want their children to be happy and 
economically successful. One possible 
source of difference could be rooted in 
parents’ desires for their children to remain 
emotionally (and possibly physically) close 
and to share their social and cultural values. 
For highly educated and well-off parents, 
these objectives are more or less consistent; 
economically successful children are likely 
to accept their family’s culture and values. 
For less-educated and poorer parents, these 
objectives may conflict: children who are 
economically successful might reject their 
family’s culture and values. For this reason, 
these parents may be ambivalent about their 
aspirations for their children. 
Alternatively, parents may have direct 
preferences when it comes to childrearing 
practices. To the extent that they do, these 
preferences will affect the investments 
they make in their children. Preferences 
for engaging in some activities rather than 
others (called “process preferences”) may 
also contribute to the class differences in 
children’s outcomes.59 Parents who enjoy 
reading to or verbally interacting with their 
children are more likely to do so than are 
parents who don’t enjoy these activities.
Even if parents with different levels of 
education have identical aspirations for their 
children and identical process preferences, 
however, differences in their resources and 
in the productivity of their time will produce 
differences in parenting practices. To the 
extent that money makes a difference to 
children’s wellbeing, greater household 
income will lead to better outcomes 
for children, and the growth in income 
and wealth inequality will accentuate 
the class divide in parental investments 
and in child outcomes. The productivity 
of parents’ time with children may also 
increase with parents’ education—at least 
for outcomes such as success in school 
and at work—because more-educated 
parents possess academic skills that they 
can impart to their children and may 
also have better information about how 
children learn.60 Theory can’t tell us how 
both higher parental wages and increased 
productivity of parental time would affect 
the amount of time parents allocate to 
their children. But we know that, in fact, 
more-educated parents spend more time 
with their children, and that the gaps are 
increasing. Moreover, although rational 
choice analysis seldom recognizes the 
problem, poverty and insecure employment 
can lead to levels of household stress that 
harm children’s development.61 The extent 
to which economic and other household 
stress has long-term effects beyond severely 
disadvantaged families is unclear.
Recent work on the dynamics of child 
development suggests another source of 
variation in the productivity of parental 
time. In a series of papers, Nobel Prize-
winning economist James Heckman and 
his collaborators have established that early 
investment in children’s human capital 
plays a crucial role in their long-term 
outcomes. Heckman’s research has focused 
on estimating the relationship between 
parental, school, and community inputs 
and children’s human capital, including 
both cognitive skills and noncognitive or 
socio-emotional skills, and on identifying 
nonfamily interventions (such as early 
childhood education) that can help 
disadvantaged children.62 One of his key 
findings is that a strong positive relationship 
exists between younger children’s stocks 
of human capital and the productivity of 
later investment in those children. That 
is, the returns to investments in older 
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children are greater if investments were 
made when the children were young.63 Thus 
child development is a cumulative process 
that depends on the full history of parental, 
school-based, and other investments.64 
This dynamic reinforcement suggests 
that both later parental investments and 
formal schooling will be more productive 
for children who have early cognitive and 
health advantages, whether these advantages 
come from genetic endowments, the 
prenatal environment, or early childhood 
investments.65 The increasing evidence that 
“skill begets skill” implies that even if the 
time highly educated, wealthier parents 
spend with their children is not inherently 
more productive, payoffs to parental 
investments are highest for these children.66
The reinforcing effect of early investments 
on later ones also suggests that parents’ 
beliefs and expectations about later 
investments by schools, by the children, 
and by the parents themselves will affect 
the expected returns to early investments. 
Because the children of less-educated and 
less-affluent parents go to schools and live in 
neighborhoods that make later investments 
from outside the family less likely, their 
parents may be less likely to make early 
investments than parents with more 
education and more resources. Furthermore, 
compared with parents with more education, 
those with less education often face greater 
uncertainty about their own future incomes 
and, therefore, about their own ability to 
make later investments.67 
A two-stage conceptual framework 
captures the essential point. In the 
first stage, the children are passive and 
the parents are the decision makers. 
In the second stage, the children are 
active decision makers exposed to an 
environment that includes neighborhood 
and school. Parents of young children 
understand that their authority will 
diminish and that nonfamily influences 
and the child’s own choices will play an 
increasing and, eventually, a dominant role: 
adolescence marks a predictable shift in 
decision-making power away from parents 
and toward children. The returns to 
parental investments made in the first stage 
depend on the environment their children 
will face and the choices their children will 
make in the second stage, including their 
willingness to remain in school and limit 
participation in risky behaviors. It also 
depends on the parents’ expectations of 
their own future income and their ability to 
make further investments.
A strong positive relationship 
exists between younger 
children’s stocks of human 
capital and the productivity 
of later investment in 
those children. That is, the 
returns to investments in 
older children are greater if 
investments were made when 
the children were young.
The wage premium for people who enter the 
labor market with a college degree has risen 
substantially in the last 30 years, increasing 
the incentives for all parents to invest in 
their children’s human capital. However, 
the returns to completing some college 
are substantially less than the returns to 
graduating from college, and the returns to 
attending college without receiving at least 
an associate degree are very low.68 Even a 
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large earning premium for college graduates 
may have little effect on the returns that 
poorer, less-educated parents expect from 
early childhood investments if they regard 
the probability that their children will 
eventually graduate from college as small.
The differences in childrearing practices 
among parents at different education 
and income levels can be explained by 
differences in information, differences in 
parents’ resources and the productivity of 
their time, and differences in preferences, 
perhaps reflecting different cultural 
norms. The expected returns to intensive 
parenting may also depend on school and 
neighborhood environments, and on societal 
investments in children. These differences 
affect parents’ motivation to make intensive 
investments in their children’s human capital 
and, hence, in their willingness to enter into 
the long-term, cooperative joint parenting 
arrangement that marriage encourages. If 
marriage is a mechanism by which parents 
support a mutual commitment to invest 
intensively in their children’s human capital, 
then parents who expect low returns from 
their early investments will see the benefits 
of marriage as substantially lower than do 
parents who expect high returns and intend 
to pursue an intensive investment strategy.
Conclusions
Since 1950, the sources of gains that 
people can expect from marriage have 
changed rapidly and radically. As women’s 
educational attainment surpassed that of 
men and the ratio of men’s to women’s 
wages fell, the traditional pattern of gender 
specialization and division of labor in the 
household weakened. The primary source 
of gains to marriage shifted from production 
of household services to investment in 
children. As a result, the gains from 
marriage fell sharply for some groups and, 
despite the weakening of traditional sources 
of gains from marriage, may actually have 
risen for others.
For some people, the decline in the male-
female wage ratio and the erosion of 
traditional patterns of gender specialization 
meant that marriage was no longer worth 
the costs of limited independence and 
potential mismatch. Cohabitation became 
a socially and legally acceptable living 
arrangement for all groups, but it serves 
different functions among the poor and less 
educated than among the affluent and highly 
educated. The poor and less educated are 
much more likely to bear and rear children 
in cohabitating relationships. Among college 
graduates, marriage and parenthood remain 
more tightly linked. College-graduate men 
and women have delayed marriage and 
typically cohabit before marriage, but their 
children are seldom conceived before they 
marry and their marriages are relatively 
stable. This class divergence in patterns 
of marriage and parenthood is associated 
with class differences in childrearing, with 
college-graduate mothers and fathers 
engaged in “concerted cultivation” of their 
children.
How do we understand these class 
differences and the class divergence in 
marriage, parenthood, and childrearing? 
Over the past 50 years, rising returns to 
human capital combined with diverging 
parental resources across the education, 
income, and wealth distribution have 
increased the expected gains to investing 
in children, especially for more-educated, 
wealthier parents. The importance of joint 
investment in children has increased, 
while the importance of other reasons for 
making long-term marital commitments has 
diminished. We have argued that different 
patterns of childrearing are the key to 
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The appropriate policy responses to 
increasing inequality depend on what has 
caused the socioeconomic divergence in 
child investments, and research here is 
at an early stage. Evidence of parenting’s 
important role in child development and 
of socioeconomic gaps in cognitively 
stimulating caregiving has led many 
countries to develop intervention programs 
that teach parents about child development 
and help them build parenting skills.69 If 
low-income parents are dissuaded from 
intensive early investments by uncertain 
future payoffs, then increased public 
investments in their children may spark the 
optimism that generates greater preschool 
investments. Children whose development 
is compromised by poverty and high levels 
of stress in early childhood may be helped 
by interventions that improve the incomes, 
health, and living situations of poor families. 
Improved prospects for investments in their 
children may, in turn, lead more parents to 
consider marriage.
The large and growing gulf in opportunities 
and outcomes that we have described is 
not simply between severely disadvantaged 
children who live below the poverty line and 
children who live above it. The “diverging 
destinies” that McLanahan has highlighted 
are now dividing children whose parents are 
college graduates from those whose parents 
have less education. Although the disparities 
in child outcomes are often partly attributed 
to the retreat from marriage and the rise 
in nonmarital fertility, we have argued that 
causation may run in the opposite direction: 
parents who are able to adopt a high-
investment strategy are those most likely to 
get married and stay married, using marriage 
as a commitment device to support joint 
investments in their children. If our analysis 
is correct, equality of opportunity will be a 
major challenge in the 21st century.
understanding class differences in marriage 
and parenthood, not an accidental or 
unintended by-product of these differences. 
Marriage is the commitment mechanism 
for the joint project of childrearing, and this 
implies that marriage is more valuable for 
parents whose resources and expectations 
lead them to invest intensely in their 
children’s human capital.
Policy recommendations should reflect 
beliefs about causal effects. Policies to 
encourage marriage rely on the observed 
correlation between marriage and positive 
outcomes for children. If the only reason 
that marriage and positive outcomes 
for children are correlated, however, is 
that parents who marry are those with 
the resources, skills, and desire to make 
intensive investments in their children, then 
this correlation is not causal but entirely 
due to selection. To the extent that policies 
to promote marriage encourage parents to 
marry who would not otherwise have done 
so, these policies will have little effect on 
their parenting practices or on outcomes for 
their children.
Our argument linking marriage and 
parents’ willingness and ability to invest 
in children’s human capital does not let us 
make predictions about the future trajectory 
of marriage. Other wealthy countries have 
progressed further down a path in which 
nonmarital childbearing and relatively stable 
cohabitation have become the norm for 
college-graduate men and women. A future 
in which the tide turns and traditional links 
among marriage, fertility, and childrearing 
reassert themselves seems unlikely. We do 
believe that the future will depend, at least 
in part, on parents’ willingness to invest in 
their children, and that their willingness to 
do so will depend on the expected returns to 
these investments.
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